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THE ATTENUATION EXCEPTION TO





For seventy years, courts have used the exclusionary rule to safe-
guard the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.' Broadly stated,
1 The Supreme Court first employed the exclusionary rule in a federal criminal case in
United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and applied the exclusionary rule to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). The Supreme Court did not rule upon the admissibility ofevidence obtained through
a violation of constitutional rights until 1914 because the Court lacked express appellate juris-
diction over criminal cases until a century after the enactment of the fourth amendment. In
United States v. Sanger, 144 U.S. 310, 319 (1892), the Court explained its appellate jurisdic-
tion over criminal cases:
The appellate jurisdiction of this court rests wholly on the acts of Congress. For a long
time after the adoption of the Constitution, Congress made no provision for bringing any
criminal case from a Circuit Court of the United States to this court by writ of er-
ror. . . . [In United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173-74 (1805)] this court
. ..held that it had no jurisdiction of a writ of error in a criminal case ...
Congress did not grant appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in capital cases until
1889, Act of February 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 656, for "otherwise infamous
crime[s]" until 1891, Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827, repealed by Act of
January 20, 1897, ch. 68, 29 Stat. 492, and finally for all criminal cases until 1911. Act of
March 3, 1911, § 240, 36 Stat. 1087, 1157 (1911) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1976)).
In Weeks, state and federal law enforcement officials searched the defendant's home and
seized personal papers and effects, all without a warrant. 232 U.S. at 386. The government
introduced the seized items at the defendant's trial. Id. at 388. A unanimous Court held that
the government's warrantless search and seizure violated the defendant's constitutional rights.
Id. at 398. The Court further held that the trial court committed reversible error by receiving
into evidence the illegally seized items. Id. The Court remanded the case for further proceed-
ings without the use of the documents seized by the federal marshals. Id. at 398-99.
The Supreme Court used a three-part rationale to justify the exclusion of the unlawfully
acquired evidence. First, the fourth amendment restrains both the police and the courts in
their exercise of authority, and, correspondingly, obligates both the police and the courts to
enforce fourth amendment protections. Id. at 391-92. Second, because a trial court can per-
petuate a fourth amendment violation committed by the police, fourth amendment rights, by
implication, exist both before and during trial. Id. at 398. Third, a remedy for fourth amend-
ment violations, therefore, also must exist at trial: illegally seized evidence is inadmissible
against the defendant. See id. at 393, 398.
The Court in Weeks believed that if trial courts admitted illegally obtained evidence,
"the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no value . . . [and] might as well be
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the exclusionary rule, or suppression doctrine, prohibits the government
from using evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
against a defendant in criminal proceedings.2 The exclusionary rule for-
bids the use of the direct and indirect evidentiary fruits of the govern-
ment's misconduct. For example, if the government acquires a
defendant's personal papers in an unconstitutional search and seizure,
the exclusionary rule forbids the government from directly introducing
the papers against the defendant at trial3 or from using its knowledge of
the existence of the papers to obtain them indirectly by subpoena.4
The Supreme Court has recognized two exclusionary rule excep-
tions that are based upon the circumstances surrounding the unconstitu-
tional discovery of the evidence. The "independent source" exception
allows the government to use illegally obtained evidence if the govern-
ment also discovered the evidence by means independent of its miscon-
duct.5 The attenuation exception, in contrast, permits the use of
stricken from the Constitution." Id. at 393. Thus, full protection of fourth amendment rights
requires that courts do nothing less than exclude illegally obtained evidence: to approve po-
lice conduct after the fact "would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an
open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution .. d.." Id. at 394.
2 Weekr, 232 U.S. at 398. The exclusionary rule does not govern only fourth amendment
violations. Courts have long suppressed evidence, typically confessions, obtained in violation
of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968); Brain v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Likewise, the Supreme Court has required the suppres-
sion of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. See,
e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (witnesses' in-court identifications of defendants must be excluded from trial where
they are the product of pretrial lineups held in the absence of the defendants' lawyers). Al-
though the Supreme Court has used the exclusionary rule to remedy fifth and sixth amend-
ment violations, courts and commentators most often discuss the exclusionary rule as a
remedy for fourth amendment violations. See generally Comment, Trends in Legal Commentagy on
the Exclusionag Rule, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 373 (1974) and cases and authorities
cited therein.
3 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4 See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). For further
discussion of Silverthorne, see infia note 20.
5 Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392. The independent source exception actually is more of a
correlate than an exception to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule states that the
government cannot use illegally obtained evidence; the independent source exception states
that the government can use illegally obtained evidence if the government also discovered the
evidence by means independent of its misconduct. Thus, the independent source rule simply
recognizes that the exclusionary rule does not apply where it was not meant to apply, to cases
where the government's misconduct was not the source of the evidence. However, because the
courts refer to the independent source rule as an exception to the exclusionary rule, see, e.g.,
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980), this Comment will refer to it as such. For
further discussion of the independent source exception, see infia notes 87-88 and accompany-
ing text.
In the 1983 term, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time an inevitable discovery
exception. In Nix v. Williams, 35 Cr. L. Rptr. 3119 (1984), the Court held that illegally
obtained evidence is admissible if the evidence "ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means .. " 35 Cr. L. Rptr. at 3123.
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evidence discovered through the government's misconduct if the connec-
tion between the misconduct and the discovery of the evidence is suffi-
ciently weak.6
This Comment will examine the courts' use of the attenuation ex-
ception to admit illegally obtained evidence at trial against criminal de-
fendants. This Comment first will trace the origin and development of
the attenuation exception.7 In Section III, this Comment will argue
that the Supreme Court did not intend to create an attenuation excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule because in Nardone v. United States,8 the deci-
sion recognized as the origin of the attenuation exception,9 the Supreme
6 See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 274-75 (1978); Wang Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). The Supreme Court also has limited the application of
the exclusionary rule based upon the government's proposed use of illegally obtained evi-
dence. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (evidence inadmissible in the gov-
ernment's case-in-chief can be used to impeach the defendant); United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83 (1980) (evidence obtained in illegal search and seizure admissible against defendant
whose fourth amendment rights were not violated by search and seizure); Michigan v. DeFil-
lippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (government obtained evidence in a search incident to arrest made
pursuant to a statute found unconstitutional after the arrest; evidence held admissible); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal courts must not use exclusionary rule as basis for
granting habeas corpus writ where the prisoner had a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate
fourth amendment claim in state court); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (evidence
state police obtained in good faith violation of fourth amendment admissible in federal civil
tax proceeding); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (despite inadmissibility of defend-
ant's statements obtained in violation of Airanda, evidence discovered as a result of defend-
ant's statements is admissible); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (government
may use illegally obtained evidence as basis of questions for witness before federal grand
jury).
Lower courts also have refused to extend the exclusionary rule to certain situations. See
United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981) (evidence admissible where the police acted in good faith when they discovered evi-
dence in violation of fourth amendment); People v. Finkey, 105 Ill. App. 3d 230, 434 N.E.2d
18 (1982) (illegally obtained evidence admissible to rebut the defendant's insanity defense).
While the above exceptions significantly limit the suppression doctrine, the attenuation
exception most clearly illustrates the conflict betwen the rationales for excluding and admit-
ting illegally acquired evidence. Unlike the other exceptions recognized by the Supreme
Court, the attenuation exception involves evidence concededly acquired in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights and offered by the government in its case-in-chief against the
defendant. Only a broadly stated good faith exception would allow the government to more
easily convict defendants with unlawfully discovered evidence than is currently possible with
the attenuation exception.
7 See in/fa notes 14-59 and accompanying text.
8 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1041 (5th Cir. 1980); United States ex
ret. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d at 865; United States v. Evans, 454 F.2d 813, 817 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972); Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 252 (D.C. Cir.
1962)(Wright, J., concurring); United States v. Alston, 311 F. Supp. 296, 298 (D.D.C. 1970);
Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REV. 483, 545-46
(1963); Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
1136, 1139 (1967); Comment, Scope of Taint Under the Exclusionagr Rule of the Fjfth Amendment
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 570, 576 (1966). But see Maguire, How to
Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusiona9, Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOL-
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Court intended only to restate the independent source exception. 10
This Comment will argue further in Section IV that the attenua-
tion exception is inconsistent with the purposes of the fourth amend-
ment and the suppression doctrine."1 The suppression doctrine is
designed to safeguard the fourth amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures by denying the government the use of the eviden-
tiary fruits of unconstitutional intrusions.1 2 Because the attenuation ex-
ception allows the government to use evidence that the government
discovered solely through an illegal search or seizure, the attenuation
exception undermines the exclusionary rule's function as a safeguard of
fourth amendment rights.1 3 This Comment concludes that courts
should not sanction the abridgement of constitutional rights based solely
upon a finding of an attenuated connection between the government's
misconduct and its discovery of evidence.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTENUATION
EXCEPTION
A. NARDONE V UNITED STATES: THE ORIGIN OF THE ATTENUATION
EXCEPTION
Courts cite the following passage in Nardone v. United States as the
origin of the attenuation exception: "Sophisticated argument may prove
a causal connection between information obtained through illicit wire-
tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, how-
ever, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint." 14  This passage appears to mean that evidence discovered
through the government's misconduct is admissible if the connection be-
tween the misconduct and the discovery of the evidence is attenuated-
weakened-so as to make the evidence untainted by the government's
misconduct. 15
In Nardone, the government introduced into evidence testimony dis-
covered as a result of illegal wiretapping.1 6 The government, however,
OGY & POLICE ScI. 307, 310 (1964) (Nardone not cited as creating a separate attenuation
exception).
10 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 76-118 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 89-96, 112-18 and accompanying text.
14 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). For cases quoting this passage as
the origin of the attenuation exception, see, for example, United States cx rel. Owens v. Two-
mey, 508 F.2d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Evans, 454 F.2d 813, 817 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972).
15 For further discussion of the argument that the Court merely restated the independent
source exception in Nardone, see injra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
16 The law at issue in Mardone was § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. Section 605
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did not introduce the illegally wiretapped conversations themselves.' 7
The question before the Court, therefore, was whether the federal wire-
tapping regulations prohibited the use of both the direct and indirect
evidentiary fruits of illegal wiretaps.' 8
provided in pertinent part: "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. . . ." 48 Star. 1064, 1104
(June 19, 1934). After Congress enacted comprehensive wiretapping regulations in Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976),
Congress amended § 605 to read: "No person . . . shall intercept any radio communica-
tion. . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976) (emphasis supplied).
The Court in Nardone applied § 605 instead of the fourth amendment because of Olm-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), which held that wiretapping was not a
search or seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See United States v. Nardone,
106 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir.), re'd, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (circuit court stated that Olmstead re-
moved case from application of fourth amendment). Although the Court in Olmstead sug-
gested that Congress had the authority to make wiretapped conversations inadmissible as
evidence, 277 U.S. at 465-66, Congress did not regulate the evidentiary uses of wiretapping.
See Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III- Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J.
CRim. L. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 11 & n.48 (1983). The Supreme Court, however, barred the use of
conversations wiretapped in violation of§ 605 as evidence in the first Nardone case, Nardone v.
United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), despite the absence of any indication that Congress had
intended § 605 to regulate wiretapping. See Goldsmith, supra, at 11-12 & n.50.
The Court has frequently applied Nardone in search and seizure cases without mentioning
that Nardone did not involve a constitutional question. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463, 470 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 274 (1978); Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 598-99 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 491 (1963).
Furthermore, the Court in Nardone clearly recognized the strong parallels between the
federal wiretapping statute and the fourth amendment. When the Supreme Court reversed
the Nardone defendants' convictions after their first trial, the Court stated:
Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders go unwhipped ofjustice
than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards
and destructive of personal liberty. The same considerations may well have moved the
Congress to adopt § 605 as evoked the guaranty of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937). The Court's reliance upon Silverthorne,
which did involve the fourth amendment, in the second Nardone case, see 308 U.S. at 340-41,
also demonstrates that the Court considered § 605 to parallel the fourth amendment.
Finally, in 1967, the Supreme Court overruled Olnstead in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), holding that wiretapping can be a search and seizure under the fourth
amendment.
17 Although the Supreme Court did not refer to the nature of the government's evidence,
the government apparently introduced "testimony which had become accessible by the use of
unlawful 'taps.'..." United States v. Nardone, 106 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 308 U.S. 338
(1939).
18 Nardone, 308 U.S. at 339. The Supreme Court had considered whether § 605 barred the
use of the actual conversations obtained from illegal wiretapping at an earlier point in the
case's long procedural history. The defendants were first convicted in 1936. See United States
v. Nardone, 90 F.2d 630, 631 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed the defendants' convictions because the government had introduced into evi-
dence the conversations obtained from its illegal wiretaps. Nardone v. United States, 302
U.S. 379 (1937). The government convicted the defendants a second time, using evidence
derived from the illegal wiretaps. See United States v. Nardone, 106 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir.),
reo'd, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). Following a second reversal by the Supreme Court, Nardone v.
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The Court interpreted the statute to forbid the use of both the di-
rect and indirect fruits of illegal wiretapping. The Court concluded that
congressional regulation of wiretapping could only be effective if the
government could not use illegal wiretaps to gather evidence indi-
rectly.1 9 The Court then cited an earlier Supreme Court decision,
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,20 as recognizing an independent
source exception to the exclusionary rule.2 t The passage containing the
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the defendants were convicted a third time. See United
States v. Nardone, 127 F.2d 521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 698 (1942). In affirming the
convictions, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the illegal wiretaps "did
not, directly or indirectly, lead to the discovery of any of the evidence used upon the trial, or
to break down the resistance of any unwilling witnesses." Id. at 523.
19 After explaining that Congress had prohibited "particular methods in obtaining evi-
dence" because they were " 'inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal
liberty,' " the Court stated: "To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized but to
put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent
with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.'" Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340 (quot-
ing Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (citation omitted)). The Court then
stated: "What was said in a different context in Silverthorne . . . is pertinent here: 'The es-
sence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court, but that it shall not be used at all.'"
Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340-41 (citation omitted).
20 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In Silverthorne, federal authorities unlawfully searched the defend-
ants' office and seized the defendants' documents. Id. at 390. When the federal district court
granted the defendants' motion for the return of the seized documents, the government issued
subpoenas for the production of the same documents. Id. at 391. The defendants refused to
obey the subpoenas and the trial court held them in contempt. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed the contempt citations, holding that the government could
not use their illegally gained knowledge about the documents to obtain them by subpoena.
Id. at 392. The Court restated the rule it had set out in Weeks, that the government cannot
use the actual evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 391-92. The
Court then rejected the government's argument that it could use derivative evidence, evi-
dence that is the fruit of the government's illegally acquired knowledge:
The [Government's] proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that al-
though of course its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may
study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge
that it has gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form to produce them; that
the protection of the Constitution covers the physical possession but not any advantages
that the Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act.
Weeks v. United States,. . . to be sure, had established that laying the papers directly
before the grand jury was unwarranted, but it is taken to mean only that two steps are
required instead of one. In our opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth
Amendment to a form of words.
Id. at 391-92 (citation omitted).
The Court stated that the "essence" of the exclusionary rule is not just that the unlaw-
fully seized evidence "shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all."
Id. at 392. The Court thus extended the suppression doctrine announced in Weeks: both the
direct and indirect fruits of unconstitutional searches and seizures are inadmissible against a
defendant.
21 The Court stated:
Here, as in the Silverthorne case, the facts improperly obtained do not "become sacred
and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may
be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong
cannot be used by it" simply because it is used derivatively.
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language of attenuation immediately followed.22
The Court stated that trial courts should use a three-step procedure
to determine whether the government's conduct tainted its evidence:
first, whether the government used illegal wiretaps; second, whether a
"substantial portion" of the government's case is a product of the illegal
wiretaps; and third, whether the government's evidence had an origin
independent of the illegal wiretaps.2 3 Because the trial court had not
conducted this three-step examination of the government's evidence, the
Court reversed the defendants' convictions and remanded the case for
further proceedings.2 4
B. WONG SUN V UNITED STATES: ATTENUATION REVITALIZED
Courts and commentators initially did not interpret Nardone as an-
nouncing an attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule.25 In fact,
until the 1963 Supreme Court decision in Wong Sun v. United Slales,26 the
few federal circuit courts that applied Nardone's attenuation language
did so without clearly explaining the connection between attenuation
and the exclusionary rule.27 In Wong Sun, the Court elaborated upon the
attenuation exception, both clarifying and confusing the doctrine in the
process.
Wong Sun involved the admissibility of confessions and tangible evi-
dence against two defendants. The Supreme Court held that the gov-
ernment agents' unlawful invasion of the first defendant's home tainted
Id. at 341 (quoting Silverthome, 251 U.S. at 392).
22 Id. The passage is quoted supra at text accompanying note 14.
23 Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
24 Id. at 342-43. Upon retrial, the defendants were again convicted and their convictions
were upheld. See supra note 18.
25 See, e.g., United States v. Nardone, 127 F.2d 521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 698
(1942); United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1941); United States v. Weiss, 34 F.
Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Bernstein, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: A Fresh Appraisal of the Civil
Liberties Involved in Wiretapping and Its Derivative Use, 37 ILL. L. REV. 99 (1942); 14 FLA. L.J.
373 (1940); 2 LA. L. REv. 759 (1940); 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 82 (1940); 18 TEx. L. REv. 504
(1940). Observers probably did not interpret Nardone as creating an attenuation exception
because Nardone involved a wiretapping statute that fell outside the scope of the fourth
amendment, see supra note 16, and fourth amendment exclusionary principles. See generaly
Bernstein, supra.
26 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The Supreme Court cited the attenuation language in only two
cases prior to Wong Sun. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962) (legislative committee's
questions of petitioner were based upon information known independent of illegal eavesdrop-
ping; Nardone distinguished as applying to criminal prosecutions); Costello v. United States,
365 U.S. 265 (1961) (grand jury's questions of petitioner were based upon information known
prior to and independent of the illegal wiretaps).
27 See, e.g., Tindle v. United States, 325 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 883
(1964); Jackson v. United States, 313 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. Place, 263
F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom., Canty v. United States, 360 U.S. 919 (1959); Gregory v.
United States, 231 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 850 (1956).
1984]
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the statements he made immediately thereafter.28 The Court also ruled
that the government could not introduce the heroin seized from a third
person against the first defendant because the agents learned of the her-
oin's existence from the statement unlawfully obtained from the first
defendant. 29 The Court, however, held that the second defendant's con-
fession, made several days after his arrest, was admissible because "the
connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so attenu-
ated as to dissipate the taint.' -30
Although the Court in Wong Sun did not expressly recognize the
attenuation doctrine as a separate exception to the exclusionary rule,3 '
the Court identified two elements that attenuation might include. First,
the Court appeared to define attenuation as the government's nonex-
ploitation of its misconduct: if the government did not exploit its
wrongdoing, the connection between the government's wrongdoing and
its discovery of evidence is attenuated, and the evidence is admissible.32
Second, the Court suggested that the intervening act of the defendant's
free will may be one source of attenuation. 33 The Court, however, did
not explain whether the exploitation formulation was a restatement of, a
replacement of, or an alternative to the attenuation doctrine suggested
in Nardone.34 The Court also did not describe how the defendant's free
28 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486.
29 Id. at 488.
30 Id. at 491 (quoting United States v. Nardone, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). The defend-
ant, previously released on his own recognizance, voluntarily went to the police station a few
days after his arrest and gave a statement. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491.
31 The Court cited Silverthorne and Nardone for different applications of the exclusionary
rule, id. at 487, but did not explain whether the two cases created two different exceptions to
the exclusionary rule or merely provided two different phrasings of the same exception. De-
spite the lack of clarity in the Court's discussion of Nfardone and Silverthorne, lower courts in-
ferred that the Court in Wong Sun either recognized iardone as creating an attenuation
exception or created the exception itself in Wong Sun. See, e.g., United States v. Larios, 640
F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1981); Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1968),
vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 481 (1971) (per curiam); Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d
535, 541 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
32 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. The Court derived this formulation from J. MAGUIRE,
EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959): "[T]he issue ... is whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by ex-
ploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint."
33 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486. The Court stated that, under the circumstances of the
agents' invasion of the first defendant's home, "it is unreasonable to infer that [the defend-
ant's] response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the [agents']
unlawful invasion." Id. (footnote omitted). With this conclusion, the Court appeared to es-
tablish a rule that a defendant's statement would be admissible if an act of the defendant's
free will intervened between the government's misconduct and the defendant's statement,
and the defendant's act of free will was sufficient to remove the taint of the government's
misconduct. The Court, however, did not elaborate upon the application of this standard.
34 Although the Court distinguished between Nardaone's attenuation passage and Maguire's
exploitation passage, it did not explain whether each formulation applied in different factual
[Vol. 75
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will attenuates an illegal connection. The Court did not resolve these
questions until 1975, in Brown v. Illinois.3 5
C. BROWN V ILLINOIS: CONSTRUCTING A FOUR-FACTOR TEST OF
ATTENUATION
In Brown v. Illinois, the Court reviewed an Illinois Supreme Court
decision that "Miranda warnings in and of themselves" attenuated the
connection between the defendant's illegal arrest and his statements to
the police.3 6 The Court first held that Miranda warnings do not per se
break the causal connection between the police misconduct and a de-
fendant's confession.3 7 The Court then ruled that courts should consider
four factors in determining whether a "confession is obtained by ex-
ploitation of an illegal arrest":3 8 first, whether the police gave Miranda
warnings; 3 9 second, "the temporal proximity of the arrest and the con-
fession"; 4° third, "the presence of intervening circumstances"; 41 and
fourth, "the purpose of and flagrancy of the official misconduct ... 42
situations. The Court, however, applied Maguire's formulation to find the heroin inadmissi-
ble against the first defendant, 371 U.S. at 488, and applied Nardone's attenuation doctrine to
affirm the receipt of the second defendant's confession. Id. at 491.
35 422 U.S. 590 (1975). Between Wong Sun and Brown, the Supreme Court did not apply
Wong Sun's statement of the attenuation exception but continued to rely upon the independ-
ent source exception. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (Court cited Wong
Sun for the Maguire language but quoted Nardne for the requirement that the government
must establish the existence of an independent source); Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S.
219, 225 & n.12 (1968) (Court held that the government had not proved "that the defendant's
testimony was not produced by the illegal use of his confessions at trial"); Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 & n.18 (1964) (Court held that federal prosecutor may not use
witness' testimony or its fruits when the witness testified under a state grant of immunity,
unless the government established "an independent, legitimate source for the disputed
evidence").
36 422 U.S. 590, 597 (1975).
37 Id. at 603. The Court held that Miranda warnings do not per se attenuate because Mi-
randa warnings are designed to safeguard only the fifth amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation against the coercive influences of custodial interrogation. Id. at 600. Thus, while
Miranda warnings may ensure that a confession is admissible under the fifth amendment, they
may not sufficiently protect the defendant's fourth amendment rights. Id. at 601. Even if a
statement is voluntary under the fifth amendment, the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
requires that the government prove that the statement is not connected to an illegal arrest.
Id. at 601-02. The Court stated that to allow Miranda warnings to cure an illegal arrest would
"substantially dilute[]" the exclusionary rule's protection of the fourth amendment; the police
would know that Miranda warnings would protect from suppression at trial all evidence de-
rived from a previously illegal arrest. Id. at 602.
38 Id. at 603.
39 Id. The Court stated that the giving of Miranda warnings is "an important factor, to be
sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest."
Id
40 Id (footnote omitted).
41 Id at 603-04 (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (intervening circum-
stance was the defendant's appearance before a magistrate)).
42 Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491). The Court identified the
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The Court found that the connection between the illegal arrest and the
defendant's confession was not attenuated because the defendant's state-
ments followed his illegal arrest by less than two hours, no significant
circumstances intervened between the arrest and the confession, and the
police's misconduct "had a quality of purposefulness. '4 3 The Court ac-
cordingly found the defendant's statements inadmissible.44
In Brown, the Court elaborated upon its discussion in Wong Sun of
confessions as tainted fruits of police misconduct. The Court clearly
stated in Brown that the question is whether the confession is sufficiently
an act of free will to remove the taint of the unlawful arrest. 45 The
Court also used the attenuation and exploitation formulations inter-
changeably, thus implying that the two formulations were but different
expressions of the same attenuation exception.46 Although the Court in
Brown applied the four-factor test only to a defendant's confession, later
courts, including the Supreme Court in United States v. Ceccolini,4 7 ex-
tended the test to cases in which defendants challenged evidence other
than confessions as the product of police misconduct. 48
D. UNITED STATES V CECCOLINI: THE LATEST ELABORATION UPON
THE ATTENUATION EXCEPTION
In United States v. Ceccolini, a police officer discovered evidence in an
illegal search that implicated the defendant in criminal activity, and the
officer informed a federal agent of his discovery. 49 Four months after
the illegal search, the federal agent interviewed an employee of the de-
fendant who had witnessed the illegal search.9 0 The employee later tes-
tified before a grand jury about the police officer's search. Largely on
the basis of the employee's testimony, the defendant was indicted and
"purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct" as a "particularly" relevant factor. Brown,
422 U.S. at 604.
43 Brown, 422 U.S. at 604-05.
44 Id at 604.
45 Id. at 599, 600, 602, 603.
46 Id. at 592, 602, 603.
47 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
48 See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 280-81 (Court used Brown factors to find attenuation of con-
nection between illegal search and discovery of witness); United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 386
(9th Cir. 1979) (court used Brown factors to find attenuation of connection between illegal
arrest and discovery of tangible evidence). For further discussion of the misapplication of the
Brown factors, see infra note 53.
49 Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 270 (1978). The police officer, Biro, was in the defendant's store
talking with one of the defendant's employees, Lois Hennessey, when Biro saw "an envelope
with money sticking out of it lying on the drawer of the cash register behind the counter." Id.
Biro examined the envelope and found that it contained gambling slips. Id. Biro asked Hen-
nessey about the envelope, and she said that it belonged to the defendant. Id.
50 Id. at 272.
[Vol. 75
1984] A TTENU4 TION EXCEPTION
convicted of perjury.51 The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's
conviction, finding that, although the search was unconstitutional, the
connection between the search and the witness' testimony was
attenuated.52
The four-factor test set out in Brown required courts to consider the
circumstances surrounding the unconstitutional procurement of a con-
fession to determine whether the connection between the confession and
the police misconduct was attenuated. In Ceccolini, the Court elaborated
upon the attenuation test set out in Brown, adding factors other than the
circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the evidence.53 The first
factor the Court added was whether the evidence derived from the gov-
ernment's misconduct was a witness' testimony or another type of evi-
dence. The Court stated that its analysis would consider different
attenuation factors in a case involving an illegally discovered witness
than in a case involving a defendant's confession or tangible evidence.54
Second, the Court stated that the cooperation of an illegally discovered
witness is relevant to attenuation: if the witness, once discovered, freely
agrees to testify, the Court will likely find the connection between the
government's misconduct and the witness' testimony attenuated.55
51 Id. Following the defendant's conviction, the federal trial court suppressed the witness'
testimony as fruit of the illegal search. The court then granted the defendant's motion to set
aside the guilty verdict, concluding that, without the witness' testimony, there was insufficient
proof of the defendant's guilt. Id. at 270. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's ruling. United States v. Ceccolini, 542 F.2d 136, 140-42 (2d Cir.
1976), ret'd, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
52 Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80.
53 Id. at 275-79. The Court's application of the Brown factors to a case involving an un-
lawfully discovered witness was improper. Although the Court in Brown did not expressly
state that the four-factor test could not be used with derivative evidence other than confes-
sions, the factors logically bear upon attenuation only with confessions. The passage of time,
the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the government's misconduct
following an illegal arrest all could affect the government's ability to extract a confession from
a defendant. If an examination of these factors revealed a strong connection between the
illegal arrest and a defendant's confession, the confession should be suppressed.
None of the factors from Brown, however, affect the strength of the connection between
governmental misconduct and the discovery of a witness who later testifies against a defen-
dant. The passage of time or the occurrence of intervening events between the discovery of
the witness and the witness' testimony does not weaken the connection between the miscon-
duct and the discovery of the witness. See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The absence of flagrant police misconduct likewise does not change the fact that the govern-
ment discovered the witness because of its misconduct. For further discussion of the applica-
tion of the Brown factors to the discovery of witnesses, see infia note 97.
54 Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 275, 279.
55 Id. at 276-77. The Court's argument for the relevance of the witness' free will to the
determination of attenuation rested upon two questionable propositions. The Court first as-
serted that "[t]he greater the willingness of the witness to freely testify, the greater the likeli-
hood that he or she will be discovered by legal means .. " Id. at 276. Thus, because the
police need not conduct illegal searches to discover willing witnesses, the courts do not need to
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The third consideration added by the court was that a finding of no
attenuation forever prevents an illegally discovered witness from testify-
ing about "relevant and material facts," thus frustrating the truthseek-
ing function of the trial.56 Because of this "cost" to the search for truth,
the Court ruled that trial courts must find an especially close connection
between a witness' testimony and the government's misconduct before
excluding the testimony.5 7 The fourth factor was whether suppressing
the testimony of an illegally discovered witness would deter police of-
ficers from engaging in the misconduct that uncovered the witness. 58
Thus, at least in applying the attenuation exception to witness testi-
mony, courts after Ceccohni must evaluate more than the causal connec-
tion between governmental misconduct and the testimony of a witness
discovered by that misconduct.5 9 Courts also must consider the witness'
deter the police from such misconduct by suppressing the testimony of witnesses who are
discovered illegally. Id. Justice Marshall, in dissent, responded to the Court's observation:
The somewhat incredible premise of this statement is that the police in fact refrain from
illegal behavior in which they would otherwise engage because they know in advance
both that a witness will be willing to testify and that he or she "will be discovered by
legal means." . . . This reasoning surely reverses the normal sequence of events; the
instances must be very few in which a witness' willingness to testify is known before he or
she is discovered. In this case, for example, the police did not even know that Hennessey
was a potentially valuable witness, much less whether she would be willing to testify,
prior to conducting the illegal search.
Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Second, the Court stated that "[w]itnesses can, and often do, come forward and offer
evidence entirely of their own volition." Id. at 276. Justice Marshall responded that, while
the Court's observation was accurate, it was not relevant to the question of attenuation: the
independent source exception "would plainly apply to a witness whose identity is discovered
in an illegal search but who later comes to the police for reasons unrelated to the official
misconduct." Id. at 286-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 277. Justice Marshall replied in dissent that the exclusion of any evidence exacts
a cost from the search for truth. Because the suppression of illegally discovered tangible evi-
dence is as "costly" as the suppression of illegally discovered witness testimony, witness testi-
mony does not deserve special treatment under the attenuation exception. Id. at 288-89
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
The Court's argument that the value of witness testimony justifies a less restrictive excep-
tion also is internally inconsistent. The Court was reluctant to exclude witness testimony
because preventing "knowledgeable witnesses" from testifying about "relevant and material
facts" seriously obstructs "'the ascertainment of truth.' " Id. at 277 (quoting C. MCCOR-
MICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 71 (1954)). At the same time, however, the Court recognized that
tangible evidence is likely to be more reliable than witness testimony. Id. at 278. The Court
thus favored witness testimony even though the reason for favoring witness testimony-its
value to the search for truth-applied with greater force to tangible evidence, which received
no added protection from the application of the exclusionary rule.
57 Id. at 278.
58 Id. at 275, 280. For a discussion of the relationship between the attenuation exception
and the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, see infta notes 96-118 and accompanying
text.
59 The Court in Ceccoini interpreted Nardone's language as "mak[ing] it perfectly clear
. . . that the question of causal connection. . . cannot be decided on the basis of causation in
the logical sense alone, but necessarily includes other elements as well." Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at
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willingness to testify and the "cost" and deterrent effect of suppressing
the testimony in determining whether the connection between the gov-
ernmental misconduct and the testimony is attenuated.
III. THE MISINTERPRETATION OF NARDONE's ATTENUATION
LANGUAGE
As Part II of this Comment described, the Supreme Court derived
the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule from a passage in Nar-
done v. United States. An examination of the attenuation passage, how-
ever, demonstrates that the Court in Nardone did not intend to create a
new exception to the suppression doctrine.
A. THE INDEPENDENT SOURCE CONTEXT OF THE ATTENUATION
PASSAGE
The context of the attenuation language in Nardone reveals that the
Court intended to restate the exclusionary rule for derivative evidence
and the independent source exception set out in Silverthome Lumber Co. v.
United States:
What was said in a different context in Silverthome . .. is pertinent here:
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court, but that it shall not be used at all."...
Here, as in the Silverthome case, the facts improperly obtained do not
"become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge
gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it" simply be-
cause it is used derivatively. 6
0
The attenuation passage immediately followed and also showed the
Court's adherence to Silverthorne's independent source exception:
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between informa-
tion obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As
a matter of good sense, however, such connection may have become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint. . . [T]he trial judge must give op-
portunity. . . to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case
against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportu-
nity to the government to convince the trial court that its proof has an
independent origin. 6 1
The concluding sentence of this passage thus demonstrates that the
274. The Court conceded that "the particular knowledge to which [the illegally discovered
witness] testified at trial can be logically traced back to" the police officer's unconstitutional
search of the defendant's envelope. Id. at 279.
60 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)) (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 341 (emphasis supplied).
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Court did not set out a new exception to the exclusionary rule. Rather,
the Court posed the same determinative question asked in Silver/horne:
does the government's evidence have an independent origin?
Sandwiched between approving references to Silverthorne's in-
dependent source exception, the attenuation exception merely referred
to the application of the independent source exception. The court of
appeals in the Nardone case had noted that the Supreme Court had not
defined the boundaries of the exclusionary rule for derivative evidence
or provided the procedures and burdens of proof for applying the sup-
pression doctrine to derivative evidence. 62 The Supreme Court pro-
vided the guidance requested by the court of appeals, outlining the
proper application of the exclusionary rule and independent source ex-
ception in the attenuation passage and throughout the opinion.63 Thus,
far from creating a new exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court's
language in Nardone suggests that the Court merely acknowledged the
independent source exception and applied it to a case not then governed
by the fourth amendment. 64
B. DIVINING THE MEANING OF ATTENUATION
Although the Supreme Court demonstrated its adherence to the in-
dependent source exception throughout the Nardone opinion, the plain
62 Id.
63 Writing for the circuit court, Judge Learned Hand posed four questions regarding the
manner in which a trial court is to determine the admissibility of derivative evidence. In
Nardone, the Supreme Court answered each of Judge Hand's questions.
The first two questions were: "Did the [unlawful wiretaps] taint all other evidence pro-
cured through them? . . . Did the burden rest upon the accused or the prosecution, to show
to what the taint extended?" United States v. Nardone, 106 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 308
U.S. 338 (1939). The Supreme Court answered these questions immediately after the attenu-
ation passage. The defendant must first prove that the government used illegal wiretaps and
that a "substantial portion" of the government's case was a fruit of the illegal wiretapping. If
the government does not then prove that its evidence had an independent origin, the evidence
is tainted. United States v. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
Judge Hand then asked: "How should the [taint] inquiry be conducted?" United States
v. Nardone, 106 F.2d at 43. Beyond specifying the burdens of production and the burdens of
proof described above, the Supreme Court did not require any set procedures for a taint
determination. Rather, the Court entrusted questions of the admissibility of evidence to the
discretion of trial judges. The Court stated: "Such a system as ours must, within the limits
here indicated, rely on the learning, good sense, fairness and courage of federal trial judges."
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. at 342.
Finally, Judge Hand asked, "Was it too late to leave [the taint determination] until the
trial?" United States v. Nardone, 106 F.2d at 43. In response, the Supreme Court stated that
a defendant may raise during trial a claim that the government's evidence is tainted by gov-
ernment misconduct if the trial judge is "satisfied that the accused could not at an earlier
stage have had adequate knowledge to make his claim." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
at 342.
64 See supra note 16 for an explanation of the inapplicability of the fourth amendment to
the Nardone case.
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meaning of the attenuation passage suggests an exclusionary rule excep-
tion different from the independent source exception. To fully under-
stand the Nardne opinion, therefore, it is necessary to more closely
examine the attenuation language.
The critical sentence is: "As a matter of good sense, however, such
connection [between information obtained through illegal wiretapping
and the government's proof] may have become so attenuated as to dissi-
pate the taint."'65 "Attenuated" means: "Weakened in intensity, force,
effect, or value."'66 "Dissipate" means: "[T]o destroy or dissolve com-
pletely, undo, annul .... ,"67 Using these definitions, the quoted pas-
sage suggests that if the connection between the government's
misconduct and its evidence is weakened, then the evidence will not be
tainted and will be admissible. This result is inconsistent with the in-
dependent source exception, which requires evidence to have an origin
completely independent of the unlawful governmental conduct, not
merely proof that the unlawful connection is weakened.
The use of the verb "become" in the attenuation passage creates
another inconsistency with the independent source exception. "Be-
come," as a linking verb,68 suggests the passage of time.69 The passage
of time between the discovery and use of evidence, however, does not
affect whether the government establishes an independent source for its
evidence.70 Once the government learns facts through illegal means, it
will not unlearn those facts simply because time passes. Unless the gov-
ernment establishes an independent source, the unlawfully discovered
evidence is inadmissible.
One can reconcile the plain meaning of the attenuation passage
with the independent source context of the rest of the Nardone opinion
by imparting a legal, not physical, definition to "attenuated." A court
will consider an independent source, as a matter of law, to weaken or
even break the connection between the government's misconduct and its
evidence, despite the continued causal connection between the miscon-
duct and the evidence. 7' Thus, the independent source dissipates, by
65 Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
66 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 550 (1970).
67 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 510 (1970).
68 B. EVANS & C. EVANS, A DICTONARY OF CONTEMPORARY USAGE 56-57 (1957).
69 Id at 277: "[L]inking verbs['] . . .most valuable contribution is in showing time
differences ......
70 See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 289 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pas-
sage of time between discovery and introduction of evidence is irrelevant to question whether
discovery of evidence was illegal). The passage of time may affect the admissibility of an
illegally obtained confession, as in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), discussed
supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. The relationship between the independent source
exception and illegally obtained evidence is discussed further at infia note 97.
71 The Supreme Court appeared to reconcile the independent source and attenuation lan-
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the time of trial, the taint created by the government when it illegally
discovered the evidence.
It is also possible to explain the attenuation and independent
source language in Nardone without reconciling their inconsistent mean-
ings. The Court affirmed the independent source exception but injected
a passage that, according to the passage's plain meaning, suggests a dif-
ferent exception. The Court, however, did not explicitly state a new
exception in Nardone,72 and the Court did not recognize Nardone as the
source of an attenuation exception until at least a quarter of a century
later.7 3 Thus, the Court's use of the attenuation language in Nardone
likely had no doctrinal significance at the time but was only an idiosyn-
cratic turn of phrase, inappropriate to an explication of the contours of
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.74 The passage gained consti-
guage in several earlier cases. In Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961), the Court
held that the government had proven an independent source for its evidence, and held that
any connection between the illegal conduct and the evidence was "too attenuated to require
the exclusion" of the evidence. Id. at 280. Because the Court found an independent source, it
needed to go no further. Thus, the Court seemed to use the attenuation language to restate
its conclusion that an independent source existed.
Similarly, in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), in which the Court held that
the sixth amendment guarantees defendants the right to counsel at post-indictment lineups,
the Court considered whether an improper lineup tainted an in-court identification of the
defendant. The Court stated that
the proper test to be applied. . . is that quoted in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488, " '[W]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)."
Id. at 241. At the conclusion of the opinion, however, the Court stated that, on remand, the
lower court must "determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent
source . I.." d  at 242. Thus, the Court used the Wong Sun-Maguire formulation of attenua-
tion, see supra note 68 and accompanying text, and the independent source exception inter-
changeably as equivalent statements of the same exclusionary rule principle.
72 In contrast, the Court explicitly reaffirmed the independent source exception three
times in Nardone. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 342 (1939).
73 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), was the first case in which the Court
relied upon Nardone's attenuation language for its holding. It is not clear whether the Court
in Wong Sun recognized Nardone as creating an attenuation exception, or whether the Court
used Nardone's language to create the exception in Wong Sun. See supra note 31 and accompa-
nying text.
74 Although one can only speculate about why the Court used the phrases "attenuated"
and "dissipate the taint" in Nardone, there is evidence that the author of the Nardone opinion,
Justice Frankfurter, had a penchant for using odd and often inexplicable language in his
opinions. One biographer wrote:
Justice Frankfurter's opinions are the repositories for some of the most exotic words in
the English language. His interest in words, their history and slightest gradations in
meaning, finds an outlet in his writings. It is not unusual to come across such brain-
teasers as "palimpsest" or "gallimaufry" in the middle of a technical discussion. He also
loves figures of speech that are colorful but at the same time meaningful. His references
range from the nautical Plimsoll line to Elizabethan sonnets.
H. THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 343 (1960). Thomas also noted
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tutional significance only when later courts seized upon the curious
phrasing to assist their decisions not to extend the exclusionary rule.7 5
IV. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ATTENUATION EXCEPTION AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The attenuation exception conflicts with the exclusionary rule's
protection of fourth amendment rights. As originally conceived, the
right to the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence was part of the de-
fendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.76
Thus, when a court admits through the attenuation exception evidence
obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights, the
court perpetuates the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.
As currently applied, the exclusionary rule seeks to safeguard fourth
amendment rights by deterring unlawful police behavior. The attenua-
tion exception also undermines the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule by permitting the government to gain the benefit of the direct and
indirect fruits of its unlawful searches and seizures.
Frankfurter's inclination to "soar to unlimited heights in his use of allegorical or figurative
references in his opinions." Id. at 345. For a poetic exploration of the most well-known exam-
ple of Frankfurter's ability to confuse by metaphor--"the Plimsoll line of 'due process,' "
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 199 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)--see Field, Frankfurter,
J., Concurring. . ., 71 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1957).
More specifically, Professor Amsterdam has noted the confusing nature of Justice Frank-
furter's attenuation language:
Some causal connections are said, however, to "'become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint.'" Frankly, even the iron discipline that has led me single-mindedly almost to the
end of my black-letter statement of the law of the fourth amendment-even my fixed
purpose never to question whether black is grey or whether some monstrous anti-doctrine
leers behind the arras of the rules-fails me now in this last extremity. The subject of
derivative evidence, that land of poetry, of "fruits" and "dissipations" and their baccha-
nalian train, utterly resists my best efforts at cartography.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 361 (1974) (footnotes
omitted).
75 For example, in Ceccolini, the Court recognized that the unlawfully discovered witness
testimony did not have an origin independent of the government's misconduct. United States
v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273 (1978). Thus, the Court was able to find the evidence admissi-
ble only by using the malleable attenuation exception.
76 Professors Schrock and Welsh state that the fourth amendment
recognizes an exclusionary right in the defendant, a right that is conceptually and mor-
ally part and parcel with the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. . . . [T]he basic right is to be free from the entire transaction; the right to
exclusion and the right to be free from the original invasion are coordinate components
of that embracing right.
Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclsiona,7 Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59
MINN. L. REv. 251, 301 (1974) (emphasis in original).
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A. THE ATTENUATION EXCEPTION'S DENIAL OF A DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO EXCLUSION
1. The Personal Rzght to Exclusion
Although the fourth amendment does not grant an explicit right to
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, the exclusionary right is im-
plicit in the fourth amendment's safeguard against governmental mis-
conduct. The fourth amendment prohibits every branch of the
government from violating a citizen's personal security. 77 The police
and the courts are but different agents of a unitary government that
have inseparable roles in the same governmental conduct. 78 For exam-
ple, the police would have no reason to pursue wrongdoers unless courts
existed to finalize the police's enforcement of the law; likewise, the
courts could not operate unless the police gathered evidence of wrongdo-
ing for the courts to adjudge.79 Because the police and the courts par-
ticipate in the same governmental conduct, the courts can perpetuate
the police's violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights by ad-
77 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although the police may be the only government officials who
actually conduct searches and seizures, but see Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)
(Town Justice issued warrant and participated in search), the fourth amendment directs all
branches of government to safeguard the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The courts, by their issuance of warrants and their evidentiary rulings, thus may
violate the security of the people from government misconduct. See United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531, 558 n.18 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an
Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 353
n.247 (1982).
78 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 76, at 300. Professor Amsterdam also has argued that, for
fourth amendment purposes, the government must be considered a single institution with a
singular goal:
[I]t is unreal to treat the offending officer as a private malefactor who just happens to
receive a government paycheck. It is the government that sends him out on the streets
with the job of repressing crime and of gathering criminal evidence in order to repress it.
It is the government that motivates him to conduct searches and seizures as a part of his
job, empowers him and equips him to conduct them. If it also receives the products of
those searches and seizures without regard to their constitutionality and uses them as the
means of convicting people who the officer conceives it to be his job to get convicted, it is
not merely tolerating but inducing unconstitutional searches and seizures.
The admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence is therefore not, as the critics of
the exclusionary rule assume, merely something that happens after "a violation" of the
fourth amendment has occurred, and when it is too late to prevent, impossible to repair,
and senseless to punish the government for that violation. It is the linchpin of a function-
ing system of criminal law administration that produces incentives to violate the fourth
amendment.
Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 432 (footnotes omitted).
79 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 76, at 300.
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mitting at trial the evidentiary fruits of an unlawful search or seizure.80
This "unitary" theory of a defendant's right to exclusion was at the
core of the Supreme Court's creation of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v.
United States.8 ' The Court stated in Weeks that the fourth amendment
limits the power of both courts and law enforcement officials and that
"the duty of giving to the [fourth amendment] force and effect is obliga-
tory upon all intrusted . . . with the enforcement of the laws."182 The
Court also said that the fourth amendment protections would be "of no
value" if private papers could be "seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense .... "83 Finally, the Court held
that the trial court had violated the defendant's constitutional rights by
refusing to return the seized papers: "In holding them and permitting
their use upon trial,. . . prejudicial error was committed. a8 4 Through-
80 Professors Schrock and Welsh explain:
Search, seizure, and use are all part of one "evidentiary transaction," and every such
transaction presupposes a court as well as a policeman. Because the court is integral to
the evidentiary transaction, it cannot insulate itself from responsibility for any part of
that transaction, and specifically not from responsibility for the manner in which evi-
dence is obtained. The only way the court can avoid consummating an unconstitutional
course of conduct in which, wittingly or unwittingly, it has been involved from the begin-
ning, is to abort the transaction by excluding the evidence. To admit the evidence is for
the court to implicate itself in the unconstitutional police misconduct and to violate the
Constitution.
Id. at 298-99 (footnote omitted). Professors Schrock and Welsh also advance a second, "con-
stitutional[ly] equal" right to exclusion. Id. at 309. They first contend that the principle of
judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), obligates all
courts to apply the "law of the land"--the Constitution-in the cases brought before them.
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 76, at 309. When a defendant alleges that the government has
violated the fourth amendment, courts must determine, as they must do with all challenged
governmental conduct, id. at 325, whether the particular search or seizure passes constitu-
tional muster. Id. at 308-09.
Second, Schrock and Welsh maintain that all defendants have a due process right not to
be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S. CONST. amend. V,
XIV, which means, conversely, that all such deprivations must be consistent with the com-
mands of the Constitution. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 76, at 361-62; Sunderland, Liberals,
Conservatives, andthe Exclusionag Rule, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 372 (1980) ("[Tjhe
due process clause of the fifth amendment would allow no deprivation of life, liberty, or
property except insofar as the commands of the Constitution are followed throughout the
proceedings."). Thus, when a court finds that a search or seizure violates the fourth amend-
ment, it must exclude the evidentiary fruits of the search or seizure. To admit the illegally
obtained evidence would be to approve a deprivation of the defendant's liberty by means that
violated the Constitution. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 76, at 326. The court also would be
disregarding its judicial review duty to approve only that governmental conduct that con-
forms to constitutional requirements. Id. at 308-09, 351; see Sunderland, supra, at 375.
81 See supra note 1 for a discussion of Weeks and the origin of the exclusionary rule.
82 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
83 Id. at 393.
84 Id. at 398. Professors Schrock and Welsh maintain that the Court's holding
makes it clear that the Weeks Court recognized two violations, one by the marshal and
one by the court, neither of which was regarded as "more" or "less" unconstitutional
than the other. And presumably these words leave no doubt that the reason the court
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out the Weeks opinion, therefore, the Court obligated trial courts to en-
force fourth amendment rights. More specifically, the Court held that
trial courts violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights by failing
to suppress illegally obtained evidence.8 5
2. The Conlfict Between the Right to Exclusion and the Attenuation
Exception
Assuming that a defendant has a constitutional right to the exclu-
sion of illegally obtained evidence, 86 the conflict between the exclusion-
ary right and the attenuation exception is apparent. The exclusionary
right requires the suppression of all evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment. The independent source exception, but not the at-
tenuation exception, is consistent with this right to exclusion.
A court that applies the independent source exception finds that,
although the government violated the fourth amendment, the govern-
ment discovered the challenged evidence independent of the fourth
amendment violation.87 Proof of an independent source allows the
court to admit the evidence without approving the fourth amendment
violation. Conceptually, the unlawful source and the independent
source run parallel to one another from the discovery of the evidence to
its offer at trial. The independent source, however, ends the fourth
amendment violation's effect upon the admissibility of the evidence.
Evidence with an independent source, therefore, is admissible without
violating a defendant's right to exclusion.88
does not have the right to admit the evidence is that the defendant has a fourth amend-
ment right to its suppression.
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 76, at 301 (emphasis in original).
85 See Weekr, 232 U.S. at 398.
86 See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text for an argument that suppression of ille-
gally obtained evidence is a personal constitutional right. The Supreme Court currently does
not consider the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence "a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See infra notes 98-111
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's position that the exclusionary rule is
designed primarily to deter police misconduct.
87 See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 146-47 (1962) (state legislative committee's
questions of defendant were based upon information learned independent of unlawful eaves-
dropping); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 279-80 (1961) (grand jury's questions of
defendant were based upon information learned independent of illegal wiretaps); United
States v. Houltin, 566 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 826 (1978) (identifica-
tions of challenged witnesses learned independent of illegal wiretaps); United States v. Ken-
nedy, 457 F.2d 63, 66 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 864 (1972) (search that produced
evidence was based upon valid warrant obtained independent of illegal arrest); Durham v.
United States, 403 F.2d 190, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 481
(1971) (per curiam) (location of evidence learned from independent source, not from illegal
search).
88 See supra note 5. For cases illustrating the application of the independent source excep-
tion consistent with the personal right to exclusion, see United States v. Humphries, 636 F.2d
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The attenuation exception, in contrast, denies a defendant's exclu-
sionary right. Courts that apply the attenuation exception concede that
the government's misconduct led to the discovery of the evidence admit-
ted against the defendant. 9 The courts acknowledge but refuse to give
"force and effect" 90 to the defendant's fourth amendment rights when
the government offers the evidentiary fruits of unlawful searches and
seizures. 9 1 Instead, courts admit illegally obtained evidence because the
connection between the government's misconduct and its discovery of
the evidence has become weakened by the passage of time,92 human
volition,93 the government's good intentions,9 4 or serendipity. 95 Finally,
in an even more "attenuated" application of the attenuation exception,
the courts admit illegally obtained evidence when the illegal connection
is "broken" by the perceived need for relevant evidence or by the per-
ceived futility of deterring police misconduct. 96
Because the attenuation exception abridges the constitutional right
to exclusion, courts should no longer use the attenuation exception to
1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988 (1981) (evidence gained through lawful
surveillance, not from unlawful detention); Houltin, 566 F.2d at 1031; Kennedy, 457 F.2d at 66;
Durham, 403 F.2d at 195-96; McGarry's, Inc. v. Rose, 344 F.2d 416, 418-19 (Ist Cir. 1965)
(agents had prior knowledge of illegally seized documents and had issued a summons for
them before the illegal seizure); Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1958), after
remand, 274 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 908 (1964) (defendant's first con-
viction reversed where government used as evidence set of defendant's fingerprints obtained
during illegal detention; defendant's conviction upon retrial affirmed where government used
set of fingerprints in existence at time of illegal detention).
89 For example, in United States v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991, 995 n.3 (5th Cir.),cert. denied, 456
U.S. 964 (1982), the court stated: "We do not address the independent source argument
because the government admits. . . that the leads to the witnesses were developed in fact
from information found in the [illegally seized] diary." See also United States v. Ceccolini,
435 U.S. 268, 273 (1978); United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 386, 391 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Carsello, 578 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 979 (1978); United States
v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
90 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
91 See cases cited ru/pra note 89.
92 See, e.g., Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 275, 279; United States v. One 1979 Mercury Cougar
XR-7, 666 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1982).
93 See, e.g., Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276-79; Miller, 666 F.2d at 995-96;Jones, 608 F.2d at 391;
Carrelo, 578 F.2d at 203 & n.3; Houltin, 566 F.2d at 1032.
94 See, e.g., Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80;Jones, 608 F.2d at 391; Carsello, 578 F.2d at 204 &
n.4.
95 Bacall, 443 F.2d at 1057; United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166, 1170-71 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912 (1971).
96 See, e.g., Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277-80;Jones, 608 F.2d at 391; Carsello, 578 F.2d at 204. In
fact, Justice Powell, concurring in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), so injected policy
considerations into the determination of attenuation that he converted the question of attenu-
ation from an examination of the factual connection between misconduct and the discovery
of evidence into a balancing test of the social desirability of the exclusionary rule: "The no-
tion of the 'dissipation of taint' attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental conse-
quences of illegal police action becomes so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule no longer justifies the cost." Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
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admit illegally obtained evidence. Instead, courts should apply the ex-
clusionary rule solely in conjunction with the independent source excep-
tion, allowing the government to use illegally obtained tangible or
verbal evidence 97 only when discovered independent of the govern-
ment's misconduct.
B. THE ATTENUATION EXCEPTION'S FRUSTRATION OF THE
DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Supreme Court currently considers that the exclusionary rule's
"prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unlawful
searches and seizures. ... 98 As a result, the Court has not applied the
exclusionary rule where the Court believes that the suppression of evi-
97 The exclusionary rule and independent source exception, formulated in cases involving
tangible evidence, do not precisely fit cases involving illegally obtained verbal evidence. For
example, the governmental misconduct may only directly produce the discovery or detention
of a defendant; any subsequent statement is derivative evidence. The intervention of a de-
fendant's volition, however, may make the statement independent of the misconduct. A de-
fendant's volition can be the independent source of the statement because a defendant's fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination protects a defendant from making incriminating
statements even if illegally arrested and detained. Therefore, if, after an illegal arrest, a de-
fendant voluntarily waives his fifth amendment right and makes a statement, the defendant's
volition truly is a source independent of the government's misconduct. See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (analyzed under independent source exception, defend-
ant's decision to voluntarily make a statement three days after illegal arrest would constitute
independent source).
The fact that a defendant's statement is voluntary under the fifth amendment, however,
would not necessarily make the statement admissible under the fourth amendment. The
Court stated in Brown v. Illinois that the voluntariness of a statement under the fifth amend-
ment was only a "threshold requirement" for determining admissibility under the fourth
amendment. 422 U.S. at 601-02, 604. Thus, courts should use the four factors set out in
Brown bearing upon the attenuation of the connection between misconduct and a defendant's
statement to determine whether a defendant's volition is an independent source.
Although illegally discovered witness testimony and defendants' statements are both ver-
bal evidence, courts should not consider the volition of an illegally discovered witness as an
independent source for the witness' testimony. Because of the right against self-incrimination,
the illegal discovery of a defendant's identity will not guarantee the acquisition of a voluntary
confession. The fifth amendment, however, does not protect non-defendant witnesses from
making statements that only incriminate a defendant. Unless illegally discovered witnesses
have particular reasons not to cooperate with the police and cannot be persuaded by immu-
nity grants or threats of contempt, the witnesses will testify voluntarily against the defendant.
See, e.g., Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279. The discovery of the witness, therefore, is tantamount to
obtaining the testimony either through the witness' cooperation or the government's persua-
sion. Id. Under exclusionary rule principles, therefore, the government's misconduct, not the
witness' volition, is the source of the witness' testimony. Id. at 287-88 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Thus, courts should evaluate the testimony of illegally discovered witnesses as they eval-
uate tangible evidence: the witness' testimony should be inadmissible unless the government
discovered the witness independent of its misconduct.
98 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
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dence will not deter police misconduct. 99 The Court also has refused to
apply the exclusionary rule where the Court perceives that the "costs" 100
of exclusion outweigh the "incremental" deterrent benefits of
exclusion. 101
Assuming that the Court correctly believes that deterrence is the
primary purpose of the exclusionary rule,10 2 the Court misunderstands
the deterrent potential of the suppression doctrine. Consequently, the
Court's application of the attenuation exception undermines the deter-
rent purpose of the exclusionary rule.
L. The Court-s Misunderstanding of the Deterrent Efect of Exclusion
The Court, at least in its application of the attenuation exception,
interprets the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect too narrowly. In Cec-
colini, for example, the Court assessed whether the suppression of a cer-
tain type of illegally obtained evidence-witness testimony-would
deter a particular type of fourth amendment violation-an uninten-
tional search for tangible evidence.' 0 3 The Court's conception of the
99 E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976) (Court states that application of exclu-
sionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings will not deter misconduct by state police);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (Court states that use of exclusionary rule in
federal civil tax proceeding will not deter misconduct by state police).
100 The "costs" weighed by the Court include: the loss of reliable and probative evidence,
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490; "deflect[ing] the truthfinding process and often free[ing] the
guilty," id.; "generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice," id. at 491; "im-
peding the role of the grand jury," Calandra, 414 U.S. at 352; and hampering the enforcement
of the law. Janis, 428 U.S. at 447. For a discussion of the Court's balancing in Ceccolini, see
supra note 92.
101 E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 493-94;Janis, 428 U.S. at 453-54; Calandra, 414 U.S.
at 351-52. The Court has created a "no-lose" formula for determining whether the exclusion-
ary rule's deterrent effect justifies suppressing evidence. In Janis, for example, the Court
stated that, if extending the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings will deter police
misconduct,
the additional marginal deterrence ... surely does not outweigh the cost to society of
extending the rule to that situation. If, on the other hand, the exclusionary rule does not
result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwar-
ranted. Under either assumption, therefore, the extension of the rule is unjustified.
Janis, 428 U.S. at 453-54. For a discussion of balancing interests in applying the exclusionary
rule, see Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionagy Rule Rest on a '"rincipled Basis" Rather
than an 'EmpiycalProposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 600, 642-50 (1982-1983) (arguing
that balancing is impossible or determined by predisposed values, and that the fourth amend-
ment itself already embodies a balance of interests).
102 The suppression doctrine's primary purpose is the protection of fourth amendment
rights, which include a right of exclusion. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text. De-
terrence is but a means to accomplish the purpose of the exclusionary rule. See Schrock &
Welsh,supra note 76, at 359 n.272 ("[D]eterrence is 'only a hoped-for effect of the exclusionary
rule, not its ultimate objective.' ") (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
103 The Court stated in Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80, that
[t]here is. . .not the slightest evidence to suggest that [the policeman] Biro entered the
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suppression doctrine, as stated in Ceccolini, is flawed in two respects.
First, the exclusionary rule is not designed to deter individual of-
ficers from committing specific types of violations. 10 4 The exclusionary
rule seeks to deter in a broader way. Rather than attempting to educate
each individual police officer who violates the fourth amendment, the
exclusionary rule seeks to instruct law enforcement officers as a group
that fourth amendment violations will produce no benefit. 10 5 More spe-
cifically, the exclusionary rule seeks to regulate governmental conduct
through "systemic deterrence," that is, "through a police department's
institutional compliance with judicially articulated fourth amendment
standards." 10 6 Thus, the extent of the exclusionary rule's deterrent ef-
fect depends upon the extent to which law enforcement officers under-
stand that fourth amendment violations produce no benefit.10 7 The
exclusionary rule's success as a deterrent and the Court's decision to ap-
ply the exclusionary rule, therefore, does not and should not depend
upon the particular misconduct of a particular police officer.' 08
Second, the exclusionary rule does not seek to deter by punishing
individual officials for their misconduct.10 9 Rather, the exclusionary
shop or picked up the envelope with the intent of finding tangible evidence bearing upon
an illicit gambling operation, much less any suggestion that he entered the shop and
searched with the intent of finding a willing and knowledgeable witness to testify against
respondent. Application of the exclusionary rule in this situation could not have the
slightest deterrent effect on the behavior of an officer such as Biro.
104 See Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 431; Kamisar, supra note 101, at 659; Schlag,Assaul on
the Exclusionagy Rule: Good Faith Exceptions and Damage Remedies, 73 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
oGY 875, 881-82 & n.36 (1982).
105 See Peltier, 422 U.S. at 556-58 & nn.15-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kamisar, supra note
101, at 660-61 & n.531; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionaiy Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CE. L.
REv. 665, 709-12 (1970); Schlag, supra note 104, at 882 & n.39.
106 Mertens & Wasserstrom, Foreword- The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Der-
egulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 394 (1981); see Kamisar, supra note
101, at 660-61; The Exclusionaly Rule Bills. Hearings on S. 101, S. 751, and S 1995 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciar, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 21-23
(1982) (statement of Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland) [hereinafter cited as
Exclusionary Rule Hearings].
107 See Oaks, supra note 105, at 710.
108 The Court's focus in Ceccolini upon the particular circumstances of the fourth amend-
ment violation to determine the deterrent effect of suppression may result in courts admitting
illegally obtained evidence whenever the police found the evidence inadvertently. See, e.g.,
Jones, 608 F.2d at 391 (exclusionary rule would not deter "under these circumstances" be-
cause police were not looking for specific evidence they discovered during an unlawful
search). Because, in every case in which the admissibility of evidence is challenged, the possi-
bility of suppression did not in fact deter the police from conducting the illegal search or
seizure, courts will always have grounds for holding that suppression will not deter the spe-
cific misconduct committed in the particular circumstances of the case. Accord Schlag, supra
note 104, at 901 & n.99 (focusing on particular facts of a case may reflect the type of viola-
tions "susceptible to deterrence" but will reduce general deterrent effect of suppression
doctrine).
109 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The [exclusionary] rule does not apply any direct
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rule creates a disincentive to conduct illegal searches and seizures."10 By
devaluing the evidence obtained through misconduct, the exclusionary
rule removes one reason for conducting illegal searches or seizures."'
2. The Attenuation Exception Undermines the Deterrent Effect of Exclusion
If the suppression of evidence removes an incentive to violate the
fourth amendment, 12 the attenuation exception encourages govern-
mental misconduct. The attenuation exception communicates to law
enforcement officers that fourth amendment violations will not affect
the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence if the government uses
remotely derivative evidence," 3 the government unintentionally discov-
ers evidence," 14 or the government discovers a witness who agrees to tes-
tify against the defendant. 1 5 Even if the government did not try to
obtain evidence in an "attenuated" fashion, the government knows that
sanction to the individual official whose illegal conduct results in the exclusion of evi-
dence. . . ."); c.f Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 280; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974);
Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 431; Schlag, supra note 104, at 881-82 & n.36.
1to See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) ("[The exclusionary rule's] pur-
pose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."); Amsterdam, supra note 74, at
431-32; Kamisar, supra note 101, at 659 n.529, 661, & n.539; Schlag, supra note 104, at 882.
111 See Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 431-32.
112 The exclusionary rule's success as a deterrent is oft-debated but uncertain. The Court
has, at different times, doubted the deterrent effect of suppression, Bivens, 403 U.S. at 416-18
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), assumed that suppression deters,Janis, 428 U.S. at 453, and de-
clined to consider suppression's potential success as deterrence. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 n.5.
The Court's reluctance to reach a conclusion about the deterrent efficacy of suppression is
understandable considering the available evidence on suppression as a deterrent. First, it is
doubtful that the deterrent effect of suppression can be empirically established. Morris, The
ExclusionaO, Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis ofLaw, 57 WASH. L. REv. 647, 653-57
(1982); Oaks, supra note 105, at 716; see also Kamisar, supra note 101, at 621 & n.304.
Second, the evidence that does exist is, not surprisingly, mixed. The empirical evidence
tends to conclude that suppression does not deter. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 101, at 657 &
n.532 ; Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv.
1229, 1267 & n. 170 (1983). Anecdotal evidence, on the other hand, generally indicates that
suppression directly and systemically deters misconduct. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 101, at
618-20, 660-61 & nn.300-01; Morris, supra, at 652 n.22; Exclusionay Rule Hearings, supra note
106, at 21-23 (statement of Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland).
Third, commentators argue that, whatever its precise deterrent effect, suppression is the
most effective deterrent; alternative responses to governmental misconduct deter either too
much or too little. Loewy, supra, at 1265-66; Exclusionay Rule Hearings, supra note 106, at 22
(statement of Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland); see also Kamisar, supra note
101, at 618-20; Schlag, supra note 104, at 907-13. Finally, some argue that abolishing the
exclusionary rule, or creating new exceptions to the rule, would encourage misconduct,
whatever may be the exclusionary rule's current success in discouraging misconduct. See
Kamisar, supra note 101, at 662-64; Schlag, supra note 104, at 901-02.
113 See, e.g., Carsello, 578 F.2d at 203.
114 See, e.g., Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 280;Jones, 608 F.2d at 391.
115 See, e.g., Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279; United States v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991, 996 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 964 (1982).
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the courts will be more likely to find attenuation if the challenged evi-
dence is relevant and probative. 116
Finally, the attenuation exception gives the government an incen-
tive to continue an investigation after it has committed a fourth amend-
ment violation. Although any evidence the government initially
discovers will be inadmissible, the length of an investigation and any
intervening circumstances may attenuate the connection between the
initial misconduct and any subsequently discovered evidence.117 The
attenuation exception's many incentives to engage in misconduct thus
reduce the potential deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. 18 Because
the attenuation exception erodes the protections of the fourth amend-
ment, it should be abandoned.
V. CONCLUSION
The attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule derives from a
passage in an opinion that otherwise appears only to restate the in-
dependent source exception. To borrow from Justice Frankfurter's
description of another phrase, the attenuation language "was never used
. .. to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for
adjudicating cases. It was a literary phrase not to be distorted by being
116 See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277-78, 280.
117 In Carsello, for example, police officers unlawfully seized personal business records be-
longing to the defendant. Agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) examined the records and used them in their investigations of the
defendant. IRS agents interviewed individuals listed in the records, and these individuals led
the agents to other people and businesses associated with the defendant. With the coopera-
tion of some of these people, the IRS obtained the evidence introduced against the defendant
at trial. Carse/lo, 578 F.2d at 200-03. The circuit court affirmed the finding of attenuation,
even though a "causal nexus" existed between the initial misconduct and the challenged evi-
dence, and even though the government did "exploit" the misconduct in conducting its inves-
tigation. Id. at 202, 203. The court held that the link between the misconduct and the
evidence was insignificant, and that only the agents' "initiative and ingenuity" and the coop-
eration of informants maintained the improper connection. Id. at 203 & n.3.
118 Professor Kamisar argues that the Court wrongly creates exceptions to the exclusionary
rule on the ground that the "cost" of suppression in a particular case outweighs the incremen-
tal deterrence gained through suppression. See Kamisar, supra note 101, at 664. Each new
exception reduces the general deterrent effect of suppression by communicating to law en-
forcement officials that any one of several loopholes will later admit illegally obtained evi-
dence: "Although the police may not be thinking about any particular one of [the]
permissible collateral uses of unlawfully-seized evidence, they may well go ahead with the
unlawful search, confident that in one way or another it is likely to pay off." Mertens &
Wasserstrom, supra note 106, at 388. Multiple exceptions not only create multiple incentives
to violate constitutional rights, Kamisar, supra note 101, at 664, they complicate the exclu-
sionary rule and make it more difficult for the police to follow the constitutional require-
ments. See Schlag, supra note 104, at 901-02. The cumulative effect of the many exceptions,
therefore, is to deprive the suppression doctrine of any deterrent effect it may have had. See
Kamisar, supra note 101, at 664.
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taken from its context."' 9 Once taken from its context, the attenuation
exception has violated the personal constitutional right of defendants to
the suppression of illegally obtained evidence, and has undermined the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. As the Supreme Court ini-
tially required for illegally obtained evidence, therefore, the attenuation
exception should not be used at all.
BRENT D. STRATTON
119 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring
to Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger" test).
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